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A NOTE ON THE RIGHT OF 
SECESSION AS A HUMAN RIGHT* 
CHRIS N. OKEKE" 
I. THE RIGHT TO SECEDE AS A PEOPLE'S RIGHT 
Alexander Martinenko's article, "The Right Of Secession As 
A Human Right," is certainly a commendable and bold attempt 
by an international legal scholar from the former Soviet bloc to 
tackle a subject of such unprecedented controversy in interna-
tionallaw. The debate as to whether the principle of self-deter-
mination is a right in international law, or simply a principle 
of political thought, has assumed great prominence in interna-
tional affairs at various periods since the eighteenth century. 
For a long time after the end of World War II, it remained the 
most controversial issue in international law. However, the 
principle of self-determination is now firmly established as a 
right exercisable by all peoples under international law. This 
brief note is not intended to chronicle the development of the 
concept of self-determination. The history of the right of self-
determination may be found elsewhere. 1 Rather, this note 
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1. Ian Brownlie, An Essay in History of the Principle of Self-determination, 
GROTIAN SOCIETY PAPERS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE LAw OF NATIONS, 1968 
(Charles Henry Alexandrowicz ed., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1970); RUPPERT 
EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF AsIAN AND 
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examines first, the conditions that give rise to secession; next, 
the old and new normative framework and constitutional law 
and the attitude of states to secession; arguments for and 
against secession and new trends on the issue of secession; and 
the practical significance of the provision of the right of seces-
sion in the constitutions of the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (hereinafter U.S.S.R.), and the provision of the right 
to secession in the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic 
(hereinafter U.R.). 
II. BASIS OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS 
Since 1945, the world has witnessed the rejection norma-
tively and practically of colonialism and other forms of alien 
domination and control. Contemporary international normative 
systems, with few exceptions, frown upon secession, yet sepa-
ratist movements persist. Indeed, they have become a perma-
nent feature of the contemporary world scene. The reasons for 
their persistence deserve our closest attention. 
According to Alexis Heraclides, for a successful secessionist 
movement to occur, three elements must be present. First, 
there must exist a community or a society that is a self-defined 
human collectivity (an "ingroup") which is distinguishable and 
dichotomizes itself from the Center (the "outgroup,,).2 Second, 
there should be an actual or at least a perceived, present, past, 
or future inequality or disadvantage in the existing unified 
state.3 Lastly, there must exist territorial contiguity, that is, a 
distinct and integral territory in which ingroup habitation 
manifests a discernible degree of compactness over a period of 
time.4 Only if all three coexist can a fully-fledged and legiti-
mized separatist movement emerge. The three attitudes inter-
act to defuse or reinforce each other. 5 
AFRICAN PEOPLES (Harvard University Press 1960); A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff 1973); ALFRED 
COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (rev. ed., London: 
Collins 1969); U.O. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 
(Hamden: Archon 1972). 
2. See ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS (Frank Cass 1991). 
3. [d. at 196. 
4. [d .. 
5. All secessionist territories have an international border or an outlet to the 
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Secessions have sprung from separate communities, that 
is, from groups with an ascriptive basis,6 as well as from soci-
eties which are separate from the community or society at the 
Center. Two principal types of separatist societies are known 
to have emerged on the international scene: those which have 
a distinct history of separate administration from the Center, 
and those whose secession would split a nation into two.7 The 
more a group within a distinct territory nears the point of 
being considered an ethnic group or nation, the lesser the 
weight in justifying secession is placed on inequality, or to put 
it differently, the lesser the required degree of inequality.8 
Conversely, the more the group lacks ethnic identity, the great-
er the required degree ofinequality.9 
III. OLD AND NEW FRAMEWORK 
The perplexing irony about the normative basis of seces-
sion is that the very norm - the principle of self-determination, 
developed during the late 1950s and 1960s, and which seces-
sionist movements invoke in support of their goal - is the main 
legal bulwark against secession. 
The United Nations Charter refers to self-determination as 
a principle in Articles 1(2)10 and 55. 11 A series of other U.N. 
sea which allows them to seek sanctuary, access, and establish arms routes. Rare-
ly have the neighboring state(s) assisted the Central Government militarily. 
6. There are five types of categories used for identifying the ascriptive basis 
of a community. These are: 1) ethno-national identity (formed on the basis of lan-
guage), 2) national identity (in which the basis is not linguistic), 3) religious iden-
tity, 4) racial identity, and 5) sub-ethnic or "tribal" identity. 
7. It is the precise political situation which lends salience to one or the other 
separate identity and to its endurance. For example, the ethno-nations like the 
Iraqi Kurds and the Karens of Myanmar claim to have maintained the "longest 
secessionist war." There are, however, groups with an attenuated (if any) ascrip-
tive identity, such as the Southern Sudanese, as well as groups with a common 
ascriptive identity, such as the Eritreans. 
8. HERACLIDES, supra note 2, at 197. 
9. [d .. 
10. One of the purposes of the United Nations noted in Article 1(2) is to "de_ 
velop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace." See U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2). 
11. Article 55 reads in part: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
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General Assembly Resolutions has been passed to elaborate 
these articles still further. Six years earlier, in 1960, came the 
trail-blazer of the U.N. General Assembly Resolutions - the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples12 which acknowledged the "right" of "all peo-
ples" to self-determination. However, the U.N. Declaration on 
the Principles' of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
Nations in 1970 rejected any right of secession from an inde-
pendent state and condemns "any action aimed at the partial 
or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integri-
ty of any other state or country.,,13 
If self-determination refers to "the freedom of a people to 
choose its government and institutions and to control its own 
resources," there seems to be a striking contradiction between 
the right of "all peoples" to self-determination and the right of 
a state to its "territorial integrity," the latter precluding seces-
sion. This contradiction is also apparent from the U.N. pre-
scriptions and practice in regard to self-determination as well 
as in the practice of states. 14 
Constitutional law of states has been equally adverse to 
secession as a matter of international law. A very limited num-
ber of post-World War II national constitutions has recognized 
a right of secession. Examples of constitutions that recognize 
this right of secession include the Burmese Constitution, which 
at the same time provided alinost insurmountable rules of 
procedure and, not surprisingly, did not afford such a right to 
the three regional states most likely to seek independence, i.e., 
the Shan, the Karen, and the Kachin states.15 The Constitu-
relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ples of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the 
United Nations shall promote .... (ellipsis added). 
See U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
12. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. 
N4684 (1960). 
13. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. N8028 
(1960). Such paragraphs are not unusual in other U.N. General Assembly Resolu-
tions. 
14. CHRIS N. OKEKE, CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 176 (Rotterdam University Press 1974). The cases of Bangladesh and 
Biafra were studies in which inconsistencies in state practice as well as the U.N. 
were very clearly illustrated. For details see generally OKEKE supra, at 131-177. 
15. Joseph Silverstein, Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession 
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tion of the former Yugoslavia recognized the right of seces-
sion. 16 It stipulated that self-determination included secession 
but stated unambiguously that territorial revisions were possi-
ble only with the consent of all six Republics and the autono-
mous provinces. 17 The Constitution of the former U.S.S.R. 
granted under its Article 72 "the right freely to secede" to each 
Union Republic. Needless to say, that right was never allowed 
to be taken up by any of the Republics before the collapse of 
the Union. When invoked by Georgia and other Union Repub-
lics in the early days of the Russian Revolution, it was reject-
ed.1s Even most recently, the Chechnian bid to secede from 
the Russian Federation has led to gruesome war that is still 
taking a heavy toll in deaths on both sides and threatens the 
future of the Federated Russian Republic. 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST SECESSION 
A number of specific arguments has been advanced over 
the years against secession. Some of these arguments are 
strictly legal or legalistic while others are non-legal. These 
arguments have been comprehensively summarized by Lee C. 
Buchheit.19 The strictly legal or legalistic arguments against 
secession include the following: 
1. The right of self-determination can only be exercised 
once on the basis of the maxim pacta sunt servanda; 
2. International law is the law of states and not of peoples 
or individuals. States are the subjects of international law and 
peoples (majorities or minorities) are the objects of that law; 
and 
from the Union of Burma, 18 J. ASIAN STUD. 43-57 (1958). 
16. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro 
have arisen from the disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
17. YUGOSLAV CONST. prmbL and art. 5 (3). 
18. The origins of the secession clause in the former Soviet Constitution are 
based on Vladmir Ilich Lenin's approach to self-determination (in contrast with the 
more orthodox standpoint on the subject). 
19. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SESESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
(New Haven 1978). 
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3. The so-called argument based on mutuality, i.e., as 
states cannot oust one of their provinces, equally a province 
cannot secede. 
All the arguments enumerated above are rebuttable. The 
Latin maxim rebus sic stantibus20 can be appropriately used 
to deal with the first. The second argument has suffered heavy 
criticisms by eminent international lawyers in modern times. 
The view that states are the only subjects of international law 
can no longer be maintained in contemporary international 
law.21 The third argument ignores the possibility of popula-
tion transfers or cession of territories without a plebiscite, as 
in the cases of Eritrea and West New Guinea.22 
Buchheit's summary of even more substantial non-legal 
arguments against secession includes: 
1. The fear of balkanization, the domino theory, or the 
specter of the Pandora's Box; 
2. The fear of indefinite divisibility, because very few 
states are ethnically homogeneous, nor often are secessionist 
territories themselves; 
3. The fear of the effect such a right could have on the 
democratic system, by providing a minority with an opportuni-
ty for continual blackmail, threatening to secede if there is no 
conformity with its wishes; 
4. The danger of giving birth to non-viable and particular-
ly small entities which would rely on extensive international 
aid; 
20. The clause stands for "provided that things stand as they were." 
21. For a comprehensive discussion of subjects of international law, see OKEKE, 
supra note 14, at 9-124. See also CHRIS N. OKEKE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN NIGERIA (Enugu 1986). The view of states being only sub-
jects of international law can no longer stand for it has difficulty in accommodat-
ing the international law of human rights and cases of international criminality. 
22. HERACLIDES, supra note 2. 
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5. The fear of trapped minorities within the seceding state 
who presumably cannot each secede in turn; and 
6. The fear of stranded majorities in cases where the 
seceding territory is economically or strategically crucial to the 
original state.23 
The case for a right of secession has hardly ever been pre-
sented as an unqualified right for anyone who claims it. It has 
rather been a call for the articulation of adequate criteria, or 
standards of legitimacy, whereby only legitimate claims to 
secession would fall within the scope of the self-determination 
principle.24 
It is the considered opmIOn of this note, as earlier ex-
pressed,25 that the demands of self-determination must in the 
last resort be placed above the needs for "territorial integrity" 
and "non-interventionist" stands taken by the United Nations. 
But, the question is largely one of timing. Under certain cir-
cumstances a claim to self-determination, even in a non-colo-
nial setting, may be valid under international law. Third states 
must recognize and appreciate the concurrence of two compet-
ing international personalities. 26 They should refrain from 
giving support to either of them, precisely because both of 
them enjoy international personality and as such should be 
protected by international law. If an insurrectionist movement 
has acquired sufficient force and stability to call for a recogni-
tion of its character as a movement of genuine self-determina-
tion - which is not to say recognition of the insurgent authority 
as a government as such - other States are entitled, even 
bound, to recognize and deal with the insurgent element qua 
belligerent, though not necessarily as a recognized government. 
It is essential to recognize the legitimacy of its aim if it ap-
pears that it can achieve it, and if its status as a regular bel-
ligerent is apparent. 
23. BUCCHEIT, supra note 19, at 20·30. 
24. HERACLIDES, supra note 2, at 29. 
25. OKEKE, supra note 14, at 177. 
26. Id .. 
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Secession can be tolerated only as the ultimate remedy in 
a situation of marked oppression. This line of thought is not 
new. It appeared as early as the 1920's in the Aalands Island 
case, known then as carence de souverainete, and applied to 
territories which were so "badly misgoverned" that they be-
came totally alienated from the metropolitan state.27 Beitz 
argues that secessionist self-determination can be justified if 
the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of a region favor 
it and if independent statehood is a necessary condition for the 
attainment of justice.28 
V. CONCLUSION 
As matters stand today, secessionist independence can be 
achieved mainly if there is total military intervention on the 
part of a third state which has the power of defeating or other-
wise neutralizing the Center. Under present conditions, at-
tracting a large-scale intervention, such as occurred in the 
India-Bangladesh case, is highly improbable. The best a seces-
sionist movement can realistically hope for is some measure of 
autonomy or federated status in which there is adequate con-
stitutional guarantee for a good degree of power-sharing with 
the Center. 
What is clear is that the time for secessionist states in the 
international arena appears to have arrived. A case in point is 
the breakup of the former Soviet Union earlier mentioned. As 
a first case for post-colonial Mrica, Eritrea seceded from Ethio-
pia and in 1993 became an independent state. The breakup of 
the former Yugoslavia is still fresh. Until Eritrea's recent suc-
cess in its secessionist war against Ethiopia, prevailing state 
ideology in Mrica treated as treason any discussion or move-
ment about border changes, separatist movements, or ethnic 
self-determination within an independent Mrican State.29 
27. M. Crawford Young, Nationalism and Separatism in Africa, NEW STATES IN 
THE MODERN WORLD 60-67 (Martin Kilson ed., Cambridge 1975). 
28. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112-
115 (Princeton 1979). 
29. For a journalistic account of the recent creation of mini-states through the 
breakup of larger entities, see Russell Warren Howe, Countries are Breaking into 
Mini-states and That's Not Necessarily Bad, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 1994, at E8. 
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These recent events should set the people of Africa think-
ing on how best to address the problem of determining the 
"self' which would possess the right to self-determination and 
how the will of that "self' should be determined. Unfortunate-
ly, identifying these criteria will be especially difficult because, 
according to Mutua, "the colonial state substantially changed 
social relations and created new alliances and interests not in 
existence in the pre-colonial era."30 
One outstanding contrast emerges from reading 
Martinenko's article. The practical significance of the provision 
of the right of secession in the U.R. Constitution, as was pro-
vided in the Constitution of the former U.S.S.R., which is 
worth remembering, is that at least on paper, one model re-
gards secessionist self-determination as legitimate, while an-
other model such as the United States and Australia views it 
as unconstitutional and reserves for the federal union the 
sovereign authority to quell any secessionist movement. 
In the final analysis, there seems to be a good case for the 
qualified exceptional right to secessionist self-determination 
and it ought not to be rejected outright when a separatist plea 
is particularly sound. Not to recognize that there can be cases 
of well-founded secessionist pleas is not only to turn a deaf ear 
to living reality, but also a blind eye to the conceptual deficien-
cy of the old normative framework on the question. It is time 
to listen with open eyes and minds. 
30. Mukau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal In-
quiry, 16 MICH. J, INT'L L. 1113, 1176 (1995). 
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